In this paper we explore social class differentials in fertility during and after the fertility decline, in order to test hypotheses about a reversal of class differences during the transition. We use microlevel census data for Sweden 1880Sweden , 1890Sweden , 1900Sweden , 1960Sweden and 1970, enabling a careful control of various contextual variables. Our results only partly confirm the idea of a reversal in class differences. The gross differences were about as big in the early phases of the transition as they were in the 1960s. High fertility classes had about 40 percent higher fertility, or more, than low fertility classes. In the early phases of the decline, the upper and middle classes had much lower net fertility than lower skilled workers with the highest fertility levels. However, there was not a clear gradient going from highest to lowest socioeconomic status. Instead it was more a picture of the upper and middle classes having low fertility and the rest having the same (higher fertility). In the 1960s the middle class stands out with the lowest fertility, while farmers and rural laborers had the highest.
Introduction
The decline of fertility in the demographic transition has for a long time been a major theme in historical demography. Much of the literature has been focusing on the demographic aspects of the decline aiming to chart the process without actually explaining it. Other research has offered explanations to the decline mainly at the macro level making distinctions between innovation and adjustment processes as causal agents in the decline. Much less attention has been given to disaggregated patterns and micro level analyses.
One of the issues of great relevance for understanding the fertility decline is the differences in fertility according to socioeconomic status, and how these differences evolved over the fertility transition. There appears to be a generally accepted view that higher social status was associated with high fertility in pre-transitional society but that this situation reversed during the transition, or even before (Skirbekk 2008; Livi-Bacci 1986) . This change has been explained by the higher social groups acting as forerunners in the decline (Livi-Bacci 1986 , Haines 1992 ) but it remains unclear whether the change happened because new incentives were affecting the elite groups first (adjustment) or if it had to do with a diffusion of new ideas first adopted in these high-status groups (innovation) (see Haines 1992) .
Part of the differences between socioeconomic groups in fertility was also related to spatial differences in socioeconomic structure, rather than to social status as such (Garrett et al. 2001) , making it vital to control for this aspect when analyzing socioeconomic stratification and fertility in national populations (see also Szreter 1996) .
The aim of this paper is to study the socioeconomic differentials in fertility before, during and after the transition. We use data from the Swedish censuses of 1880, 1890, 1900, 1960 and 1970 covering the entire population (about 5-7 million individuals in each census), which makes it possible to look at the socioeconomic pattern in considerable detail while controlling for spatial heterogeneity.
The great advantage of census data is the coverage and the possibility of studying fertility differentials by socioeconomic status across space without problems of small sample size. They also offer quite detailed information on occupation allowing classification using standard class schemes. The main disadvantage with the historical census data (1880, 1890, 1900 ) is that we lack information to compute standard fertility rates (ASFR, TFR, etc.) and instead have to rely on indirect measures such as the child-woman ratios. However, previous analysis shows that these measures are quite accurate in depicting socioeconomic fertility differentials also in a context of moderately high mortality (Scalone and Dribe 2012) .
The first part of the paper provides a brief background on the fertility transition in Sweden and summarizes the main analytical framework for studying socioeconomic differences in reproductive behavior. A description of the census data is then followed by some indirect estimates of fertility by socioeconomic status and the main empirical analysis.
Background
Looking first at the development of fertility in Sweden over the long haul (see Figure 1) , it is clear that the long-term level of fertility was quite stable until the last quarter of the nineteenth century; between four and five children per woman, or around eight children for married women.
Beginning around 1880 period fertility started to decline steadily until the beginning of the 1930s when it began to increase again. Between 1880 and 1900 the decline was modest, but gained considerable speed thereafter. This period -between 1880 and 1930 -marks the decline of Swedish fertility. It constitutes an important phase of the demographic transition, about 100 years after infant mortality started its continuous decline (see, e.g., Hofsten and Lundström 1976) .
Looking at the cohort fertility pattern the decline started from the cohorts born around 1850, in other words women who were in prime childbearing ages in the early 1880s when period fertility started to decline.
Figure 1 here
Marital fertility followed closely total fertility, showing that the decline can mainly be attributed to a decline in marital fertility rather than changes in nuptiality, which is also a wellestablished conclusion from previous research on the European fertility transition (Carlsson 1966; Coale and Watkins 1986) . The fertility of the oldest age groups declined fastest, even though the decline started in all age groups over 25 at about the same time (see Dribe 2009 ). In terms of the relative contribution of different age groups to fertility decline it was also the prime childbearing ages (25-40) that contributed most to the decline. Just before the fertility transition most counties in Sweden did not show any signs of parity specific control, which implies that, with a few exceptions, the fertility pattern in pre-transitional Sweden can be characterized as natural (Henry 1961) . Nonetheless, the level of marital fertility varied quite a lot between counties and these differences not only persisted during the transition but actually widened in relative terms (Dribe 2009 ).
Previous research tends to support an interpretation that connects fertility decline with broad socioeconomic changes taking place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, following the transition from an agriculturally based economy to an industrial one (see Dribe 2009 ). This transition involved sustained mortality decline, increasing levels of urbanization, expansion of education and increased female market work. The question remains how these changes affected different socioeconomic groups?
Looking at the fertility decline in France, Germany, Britain, Norway and the United States, Haines (1992) showed that the socioeconomic differentials, as measured by occupation, generally widened during the transition. Fertility decline in all these countries except France was led by the middle and upper classes, while the agrarian population was slower to change. The question is whether this pattern was the result of socioeconomic change first affecting the upper and middle classes and not until later hit the lower classes as well, or if it was part of an older pattern with innovation diffusion from upper to lower social strata.
According to Livi-Bacci (1986) , European elite groups often acted as forerunners in the fertility transition, showing declining fertility quite a long time before the general decline in fertility. He also argued that at least partly the early decline of these groups was connected to urban residence, but it remained uncertain whether it was urban life as such that created special preconditions for fertility in terms of socioeconomic or cultural environment, or if it was rather something more specific to the elite groups as such.
There is also evidence from other studies pointing in the same direction. High status families in pre-transitional Sicily had considerably more surviving children than low status families which was explained by a combination of mortality and higher marital fertility (shorter birth intervals) (Schneider and Schneider 1996) . In the decline the higher social groups acted as forerunners with the poorer groups lagging behind. However, looking at Stockholm in the period immediately after the fertility decline in the 1930s, Edin and Hutchinson (1935) found higher marital fertility for higher status groups, regardless of whether status was measured by occupation, wealth or education. It remains unclear if these results are specific to the capital city or can be generalized to the country as a whole. In pre-transitional Norway, on the other hand socioeconomic fertility differentials were quite modest, with somewhat higher fertility (about 10 percent) in the highest status group (but it is unclear if the difference is statistically significant), and more or less identical rates in the middle and low status groups (Sogner, Randsborg and Fure 1984) . Nonetheless, the fertility decline started in the higher social groups and then spread to the lower status groups.
In his study of socioeconomic fertility differentials in Britain during the fertility decline using the 1911 census, Szreter (1996) stressed the interplay between geography and class in the decline. Fertility decline was not simply diffused socially and geographically following a certain pattern. Instead, there were pronounced differences within different social groups regionally, having to do with differences in the perceived costs of child rearing. As conditions changed, new attitudes and values spread within these regional social groups by way of a changed discourse.
This change in discourse, however, was in turn to a large extent determined by changing economic conditions. Overall, Szreter downplayed the importance of socioeconomic differentials in fertility during the transition, but this has recently been revalued using the same data by Barnes and Guinnane (2012) who argue that social class accounted for a large proportion (about 2/3) of the fertility variance between couples in the 1911 British census.
More recently the issue of fertility differentials by social class, or wealth, has also gained renewed attention by economic historians following the publication of Clark's A Farewell to Alms (2007; see also Guinnane 2011) . Based on data from wills he showed that number of surviving children was higher among richer people in preindustrial England, but also that these differences diminished well before the fertility transition (see also Clark and Cummins 2009, Clark and Hamilton 2006) and similar findings have been made for France (Cummins 2009 ) as well as for England using occupational data from family reconstitutions (Boberg-Fazlic et al. 2011) .
From a theoretical point of view, fertility decline is often viewed in the framework of innovation and adjustment (Carlsson 1966) , where the first explains fertility decline as a result of new knowledge or attitudes to fertility control, while the latter sees the decline as a result of an adjustment of behavior to new circumstances and a greater motivation to limit fertility. In an alternative, but equally classic, formulation, Coale (1973, later developed by Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001) identified three conditions for fertility decline, namely that people needed to be "ready, willing and able". These three conditions involve both adjustment and innovation.
According to the innovation perspective, fertility before the decline was not deliberately controlled, but "natural" (Henry 1961 ). Thus, marital fertility was not affected by parity-specific stopping but determined by the length of birth intervals, and these in turn were to a large extent determined by the length of breastfeeding and the level of infant and early child mortality.
According to this perspective the fertility decline was mainly a result of the innovation of families to start limiting family size by terminating childbearing after having reached a target family size (cf. Coale and Watkins 1986; Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Cleland and Wilson 1987) . In the words of Coale (1973) , fertility became "within the calculus of conscious choice", which, it seems to be implied, was not the case before the transition. The emergence of deliberate birth control involved cultural transmission of new ideas and changing attitudes and norms concerning the appropriateness of fertility control within marriage. It also involved acquiring knowledge of how to limit fertility, but many believe this knowledge to have been present long before the decline even though it might not have been used for parity-specific control, but for spacing of births or avoiding childbearing in difficult times (see, e.g., Bengtsson and Dribe 2006; David and Sanderson 1986; Dribe and Scalone 2010: Santow 1995; Szreter 1996; Van Bavel 2004) .
One might expect that higher social groups would be more likely to formulate and adopt these new ideas as they were culturally more open and increasingly felt it important to distinguish themselves from the lower classes. Such a strategy of distinction in the middle class has been shown important for other aspects of family life, for instance in marriage patterns (see Van de Putte 2007 ; see also Frykman and Löfgren 1978) . The middle class and elite groups can also be expected to have been better able to acquire new knowledge about methods of birth control to the extent that these were not generally known before. In other words, provided that innovation diffusion was important for the decline in fertility, which after all has been the orthodoxy of historical demography for a long time, we would expect high social status to be connected to early fertility decline (see Cleland 2001 ).
According to the structural adjustment perspective, fertility decline is viewed as a response to changes in the motivation of having children. In the theoretical framework outlined by Easterlin and Crimmins (1985) , both the demand and supply of children are important in explaining the high pre-transitional fertility despite the assumption that knowledge about birth control was available, as well as the decline in fertility once it started. The supply of children is defined as the number of surviving children a couple would get if they made no conscious efforts to limit the size of the family (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985) . Thus, it reflects natural fertility as well as child survival. High mortality in pre-transitional society (low supply) together with a high demand for children implied that demand exceeded supply. Following the mortality decline the supply of children increased which contributed to the decline in fertility (Galloway, Lee and Hammel 1998; Reher 1999; Reher and Sanz-Gimeno 2007) . However, declining mortality was only part of the explanation as fertility was reduced much more than mortality which implies that fertility decline also involved the number of surviving children, or in other words in net fertility (see Doepke 2005) .
This means that a changing demand for children also was important for the fertility decline (see Brown and Guinnane 2002, Galloway, Hammel and Lee 1994; Dribe 2009; Mosk 1983; Schultz 1985; Crafts 1984) . The demand for children can be defined as the number of children a couple would want if there were no costs to limit fertility, depending on family income and the cost of children in relation to other goods that are directly related to social status, economic conditions and occupational levels. Following industrialization and urbanization the motivation to have children changed, and this can be expected to have affected socioeconomic groups differently. On the one hand, higher consumption aspirations among high status groups would have increased opportunity costs of childbearing and therefore contributed to a reduced demand for children. On the other hand, since children could help out working in the fields or assisting in supplementary activities, from a relatively early age, economic benefits of children might also have been higher among low and middle class families in rural contexts, implying a delayed response in terms of fertility decline in these groups.
In addition, as industrialization and urbanization increased the returns to education, demand for child quality also increased (Becker 1991) . This led families to substitute quantity for quality, by having fewer children and investing more in each child. This quantity-quality trade-off has been viewed as an important explanation for the decline in fertility (see, e.g., Dribe 2009; Wahl 1992) as well as for the escape from the Malthusian trap and emergence of modern economic growth (e.g., Galor 2005; see also Becker et al. 2010; Guinnane 2011 ).
Empirical studies have also confirmed that smaller family sizes in the demographic transition became increasing connected to socioeconomic upward mobility for children (Van Bavel 2006 , Van Bavel et al. 2011 Bras, Kok and Mandemakers 2010) . It could be expected that this change towards more investments in child quality would first be adopted by the higher status groups, partly because of a higher return to education in these occupations and partly because of better knowledge and information about the new conditions emerging in these socioeconomic groups.
After the transition we expect economic factors to have become even more important for determining fertility, as deliberate fertility control was now widely accepted, and thus there should have been much less resistance in form of attitudes and prejudice to overcome for potential controllers. Nonetheless, especially in economic research a very strong emphasis has been put on the spread of the contraceptive pill for the efficiency of the fertility control, with far reaching impact on women's education and career choices (Goldin and Katz 2002; Bailey 2010) . From this point of view highly educated women, married to professional men should have had lower fertility, especially in the 1970 census.
Apart from this possible effect of the contraceptive revolution of the 1960s, fertility can be expected to have been connected to social class mainly through income and aspirations for children (child quality). In the economic fertility models, higher income, and thus normally higher social class, gives financial opportunities for larger families (more spacious housing, domestic servants, higher level of consumption). At the same time, opportunity costs of parental time devoted to children would be higher in upper classes, which would work towards lower fertility.
Finally, the trade-off between quantity and quality of children can be expected to be stronger in middle and upper classes because of higher aspirations for children, requiring long education and more expensive life styles (clothing, leisure activities, etc.). All together this probably means that it would only be among the really wealthy that the income effect would dominate over all other effects, and lead to large families, while especially in the aspiring middle class the quantity-quality trade-off would totally dominate the income effect, leading to low fertility even in contexts where women were homemakers. In the countryside, on the other hand, this trade-off was probably much less pressing, and at the same time comparatively spacious housing, low education level, traditional attitudes, and low opportunity costs following close proximity of work and home, would lead to relatively high fertility.
Based on the preceding discussion we expect a positive association between fertility and socioeconomic status before the fertility transition, at least in terms of total fertility (for marital fertility this is less clear). More relevant for this study, however, we should expect an earlier decline among the higher status groups leading to lower fertility in these groups early in the transition. It is most likely that this pattern prevailed after the transition, except perhaps in the upper classes. Moreover, we expect substantial geographical differences in the fertility decline both between different regions and between urban and rural areas. Because the patterns of socioeconomic stratification also differ regionally, socioeconomic differentials will be smaller when also taking the spatial patterns into account.
Data
We use micro level data from five different Swedish censuses (1880, 1890, 1900, 1960 and 1970) .
Data for the first three were digitized by the Swedish National Archives and are about to be published by the North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP, see Ruggles et al. 2011; Sobek et al. 2011 ) which adopts the same format as the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).
Here we have used the original data coded by the Swedish National Archives within the project From these five censuses we have created a sample of women aged 15-54 to make sure that all children 0-4 to women 15-49 are included. Only married women with their spouses present are included. Descriptive statistics of these samples are described in Table 1 . We have about 600,000 women in each of the first three censuses and 1.3 million in the two latter censuses. Table 1 here We follow a long tradition in social stratification research in using husband's occupation to different ideas and theories on class and stratification itself (see, e.g., Thålin 2007) . Here, we use a common scheme developed by Erikson, Golthorpe and Portocarero (1979) , henceforth called the EGP.
1 As is the case with HISCLASS, EGP is based on skill level (manual, nonmanual, etc.), employment relations (employee, self-employed, employer) and sector (rural, nonrural) (see Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993:35-47 In the analysis we also control for age, age difference between spouses, presence of children over 4 in the family and employment status of the woman. The latter is not straightforward to measure because of the problem of farming. To include all wives in the farming sector as employed would give much higher estimates than the ones presented here, where we have only included occupations noted in the sources (i.e. not wife). For example only about half a percent of all married women in the age group 15-54 were gainfully employed outside the farm around 1900 (see Table 1 ). According to the census of 1920 the corresponding figure was 4 percent (Silenstam 1970:56) . Most likely, a large number of married women did various kinds of work to supplement family income without this being recorded in the sources.
In the 1960, when we believe registration of female labor force participation to be much more accurate in the censuses, this had increased to 26 percent and in 1970 to 54 percent.
Methods
Count variables with relatively low means, such as number of own children per woman, frequently exhibit distributions that approximate Poisson distributions (Long 1997) . Therefore, a
Poisson regression is adopted to estimate the association between social class and net fertility.
More formally, the Poisson regression model assumes that the n observations y i are drawn from independent Poisson variables Y i with mean R i. On the basis of the observed characteristics, can be estimated as:
where R ij is the number of children for woman i living in parish j, x ij is a vector of k characteristics of the woman ij, the vector contains the k parameters of the individual covariates and R j denotes parish-specific fixed effects. This model controls for parish-level unobserved heterogeneity. As a comparison we also estimated negative binomial models, which are robust against overdispersion in the data (see Cameron & Trivedi 2009 The idea is to control for a number of possible explanatory variables and spatial heterogeneity in estimating the association. The main covariate is social class, which is derived from the occupation of the husband. In the first step of the analysis we estimate separate models for each census. We will present the model results reporting the incidence rate ratio (IRR) that expresses the relative change in the CWR (0-4) for a unit change in the explanatory variable, holding all the other variables constant.
Net fertility by socioeconomic status
For Sweden in this period we have data to derive age-specific fertility (both total and by marital status) at national and county levels. However, these kinds of detailed demographic data are not available by socioeconomic status. Only in the censuses can we find nation-wide data on occupation at individual level. Because census data do not permit the computation of standard fertility rates (ASFR, TFR, etc), we use an indirect measure of fertility called the child-woman ratio (CWR). The CWR has been traditionally defined as the number of children aged 0-4 per 1,000 women aged 15-49 (Shryock and Siegel 1980). It is easy to see that the children under 5 may have been born during the 5-year period before the census date, where the women were up to 5 years younger. In a previous paper using the 1900 census, we compared the CWR to other standard fertility measures, as well as to another indirect method (the own-children method) (See Scalone and Dribe 2012) . We demonstrated that the unadjusted CWR did a reasonably good job also in indicating socioeconomic differentials in gross, or total, fertility. In the 1960s infant mortality and child mortality was so low that it is unlikely to have affected these kinds of estimates much, despite the fact that relative mortality differences were much larger than before. Turning to class differences they did not decline over time if measured in relative terms.
In 1880 the difference between highest and lowest was about 23 percent, in 1890 36 percent and 1900 40 percent. In all three cases the highest status group (I) had lowest fertility while the skilled workers (V+VI) and the agricultural laborers (VIIb) had the highest. In 1960 the relative difference was almost 60 percent between the agricultural laborers with the highest fertility and the petty bourgeoisie (IVa+b) with the lowest. In 1970 the maximum difference was 43 percent, with the agricultural laborers and the skilled workers having the highest and the farmers the lowest. Thus, while the magnitude of class differences in fertility did not change that much, the pattern of higher status groups having low fertility and lower status groups having high fertility was not as clear. Moreover, we find no indication of higher fertility in the elite groups before the transition, as has sometimes been observed. Before reading too much conclusion into this, however, it is important to note that we have not controlled for differences between these groups in age or other variables. Table 2 , indicating similar magnitudes in the class differences before, during and after the transition but different patterns. In 1880 the skilled workers and the agricultural laborers had higher fertility than most other groups, while the elite group had the lowest. The upper middle, and middle classes, however, did not have distinctly lower fertility. This pattern was quite similar in 1890, but the difference between the working classes and the middle classes was larger than in 1880. The elite still had the lowest fertility of all groups. In 1900 the fertility of upper and middle classes had converged and there was now two quite distinct groups: the working classes and farmers on one hand and the middle and upper classes on the other. In 1969/70, the petty bourgeoisie stands out with the lowest net fertility, while higher and lower classes have higher fertility. Table 3 here Panel B shows the estimates of a full model including controls for age, age difference between spouses, presence of children over 4, female employment and parish-level fixed effects.
Regression results
This model is quite efficient in controlling for unobserved geographical heterogeneity as identification is based on intra-parish differences. The pattern is also quite different from that in the basic model. Overall the magnitudes in the differences are lower, which shows that a considerable part of the class differences are actually explained by other factors, rather than by class in itself (cf. Scalone and Dribe 2012; Garreth et al. 2001) . We still find the lowest fertility in the highest classes during the transition. In fact, the pattern is very much one of two different groups; a low fertility group consisting of the upper and middle classes (I, II, III, IVa+IVb) and a high fertility groups consisting of the rest, i.e. of the working classes and the farmers. The magnitude of the differences is about 10 percent (the maximum difference between the farmers and the routine non-manual workers is about 30 percent). The main change between 1890 and 1900 was a decline in net fertility for the upper middle and middle classes (II, III, IVa+b), implying a convergence to the upper class level.
To delve deeper into the SES differences before and early in the transition we estimated a set of full models where SES was interacted with a variable indicating whether or not the county had entered the transition (see Table 4 ). All counties in 1880, 1890 and 1900 with a Coale-Trussel "m" greater than 0.2 (which is commonly taken to indicate the presence of parity-specific birth control) were considered as being "In transition" (see Coale and Trussel 1974, 1978) . Usually this also meant that they had TMFR20 around 7 or higher (Dribe 2009) . Overall the pattern is rather similar in transition counties and non-transition counties, but the class differences are larger in transition counties. Thus it seems as if socioeconomic differentials widened in the fertility transition in Sweden as well (cf. Haines 1992) . It is also interesting to note that the elite group (I) stands out with low fertility also in the pre-transition counties in 1880. In Stockholm city and Gotland ("In transition") the differences were larger. It should first be noted that the island of Gotland was always known for its low fertility and as Stockholm city did not have farmers and agricultural laborers, the low fertility in these groups reflect geographic differences more than class differences. Outside the agricultural classes the elite group clearly had the lowest fertility and the other groups similar levels. The large difference between the higher professionals/managers and the lower professionals/managers is quite interesting as it shows that the elite group went first in the transition, although they also had somewhat lower fertility before the transition started. In 1890 and 1900 in is interesting to note that the upper classes had lower fertility also in the "No transition" counties, but that the differentials were always bigger in the counties who had started their transition (which now includes more counties than Stockholm city and Gotland). In other words, the results make it quite clear that there was no "survival of the richest" just before the fertility transition (upper classes having higher fertility) but they acted as forerunners once the decline was under way. It is impossible from our data to tell if upper classes had higher fertility long before the transition, and then, as in England, experienced a pre- Table 4 here
In the 1960s, these patterns are quite different (see table 3 ). According to the 1970 estimates, the rate ratios span a wider range than in 1900, amounting to a 25 percent higher net fertility among farmers than in the petty bourgeoisie. Thus farmers stand out as the high fertility group in both 1960 and 1970. The petty bourgeoisie (IVa+b) and the non-manual workers (III)
show the lowest fertility, while the upper class (I) have the second highest after the farmers.
Excluding the farmers from the picture, there is a clear U-shaped pattern in 1960, which gets a little weaker in 1970, but qualitatively remains the same. Of course, the reasons for the higher fertility in these different classes could be totally different. In the upper class high income in male-breadwinner families may have implied few restrictions on fertility, while in the working class it may have to do with later adoption of the most efficient contraceptives or that positive attitudes to larger families lingered on. Farmers also faced fewer constraints on fertility because they worked at, or close to home, and also had more space in their homes. To some extent a greater demand for children on the farm may also have played a role, although it should have been much less than in the past. The aspiring middle classes (especially III, IVa+b), on the other hand, are the groups in which we expect to find the strongest trade-off between number of children and investments in these children. They often had educational ambitions for their kids at a time when costs of having children in education was substantial, not primarily because of school fees, but because children did not start to work and contributed to the upkeep of the household. Hence, the low fertility in this group makes good sense from an economic point of view.
These results are all based on separate cross sections. In order to corroborate the results in a more dynamic perspective we also linked the censuses and studies how class in one census affected the number of own children 0-9 in the subsequent census. In the historic censuses (1890, 1900) the linkage was based on a simple linking procedure using first name, last name, place of birth and year of birth for the husband and the wife. In the linkage we used standardized names provided by the SweCens project. 
Conclusion
Class differences in fertility has not received as much scholarly attention as class differences in mortality, on which there is a vast literature both before, during and after the demographic transition. Also in fertility research most attention has been devoted to other determinants, such as education, religion, labor force participation, public policy etc. From the research available, the conventional wisdom seems to be that class differences reversed during the demographic transition, going from a situation where the upper classes had higher fertility to a situation, after the transition, when they had lower.
Our results only partly confirm this view. Immediately before the transition, there is no indication that elite groups had higher fertility than the rest. Instead most evidence point to smaller social class differences in fertility before the transition than early in the transition and after the transition. Looking at the gross class differences they were about as big in the early phases of the transition as they were in the 1960s. High fertility classes had about 40 percent higher fertility, or more, than low fertility classes. Before the transition this difference was only about 20 percent.
In the early phases of the decline, the upper and middle classes had much lower net fertility than lower skilled workers. However, there was not a clear gradient going from highest to lowest socioeconomic status. Instead it was more a picture of the upper and middle classes having low fertility and the rest having the same (higher fertility). In the 1960s the middle class stands out with the lowest fertility, while farmers and rural laborers had the highest together with the elite .
At the turn of twentieth century, the upper classes clearly acted as forerunners in the fertility decline. They registered the lowest fertility in the 1880 and 1890 censuses, and the middle class quickly converged to the same level in 1900. On the contrary, other social groups remained on almost the same fertility levels as ten years before. At the onset of the fertility decline, despite the socioeconomic changes that were going on, a kind of barrier still isolated the forerunners, preventing the diffusion of new ideas on contraception to all the social groups. On the other hand, looking at the post-transition period, reproductive behavior appears more diversified, changing in function of constraints and needs of each social class.
Overall, this provides no clear support for the idea of a reversal of class differences in the demographic transition, going from a situation where upper classes had high fertility and lower classes had low fertility to the reverse. It is clear that class mattered, but there is no simple gradient to explain the pattern. Instead, specific conditions for different classes in terms of income, education, attitudes, and aspirations for children created different incentives, which determined the outcome. Geography was also important. As we could previously show in an analysis of the 1900 census (Scalone and Dribe 2012) , spatial heterogeneity explain up to half of the class differences on the national level, which stresses the importance of looking at class differences in a spatial context.
Nonetheless, also when including powerful controls for unobserved spatial heterogeneity, there were clear class differences in net fertility, and the basic pattern was more or less unchanged. The low fertility of the upper classes in the early phases of the transition is consistent with explanations focusing both on adjustment of fertility to new socioeconomic circumstances and on diffusion of new attitudes towards birth control and ideal number of children. We expect both these processes to affect the upper and middle classes first. The fact that the real elite (the highest group comprising about 3 percent of the population) had lower fertility than other groups in 1880 and then the upper-middle class (lower managers and professionals) followed in 1890-1900, may be taken as an indication of the importance of innovation-diffusion factors, as the pure economic adjustment should not have been too pressing in the elite group with low opportunity costs of child bearing (low female labor force participation) and high material standard of living, allowing both spacious housing and domestic servants. It may well have been the case that new attitudes to birth control developed and spread through society, first affecting behavior of the most well off groups and with some delay also the middle classes.
After the transition, the low fertility of the middle class, seems clearly consistent with a trade-off between quantity and quality of children. Also when we control for female employment and spatial differences, these groups had low fertility, and they can be expected to have been in a situation where their income was not sufficiently high to afford both high educational aspirations for their children and a high number of children. This led them to lower their fertility below levels of both higher status and lower status groups. The rather high fertility of the elite in this period could partly be seen as a consequence of less income constraints and a lower relative price of children, but perhaps also as an indication of early adoption of new and more fertility prone behavior.
In conclusion our analysis have shown that social class clearly mattered for the course of the fertility transition, and that it has continued to do so also in the post-transition period. These class differences cannot fully be explained by differences in female labor force participation or residential patterns, but most likely reflect other economic realities of families in these groups, as well as possible differences in attitudes and norms surrounding childbearing, producing quite dramatic differences in the number of children. Source: Statistics Sweden (1999). Note: CTFR is the accumulated number of children at age 50. X-axis refer to year of birth for cohort fertility. 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 Number of children per woman TFR TMFR20 CTFR 
